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ABSTRACT
At a time of “austerity localism”, this paper explores how local
authorities in London, England, are simultaneously addressing the
dual pressures of delivering ﬁscal retrenchment and of enrolling
citizens in new participatory public service arrangements, asking
whether “these trends pull against one another, in opposite direc-
tions, or whether they are the tough and tender dimensions of a
singular process: austerian management” Drawing on empirical
research into the London Borough of Lambeth’s Cooperative
Council agenda, as well as Foucauldian and Gramscian critiques
of participatory network governance theories and practice, this
paper shows how participatory forms of governance can be folded
into the logic of hierarchy and coercion through various govern-
mental technologies of performance and agency (consent), and
through tactics of administrative domination (coercion). As budget
cuts continue to aﬀect local government in England, this paper
concludes that although small experiments in participatory gov-
ernance may persist, the dominant mode of governance is likely to
shift towards more hierarchical and coercive forms.
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1. Introduction
For the past ﬁve years, England has been at the vanguard of self-imposed austerity.
Soon after its formation in May 2010, in an attempt to “pay down the national deﬁcit”,
the Coalition Government embarked on “the most far-reaching and precipitate attempt
to achieve fundamental restructuring in an established welfare state. . . in recent years”
(Taylor-Gooby, 2012, p. 61). Local government has been at the heart of this restructur-
ing process as both “site and target” (Ward et al., 2015, p. 443) of ﬁscal retrenchment
and a renewed emphasis on localism. Local authorities increasingly ﬁnd themselves in
the uneasy position of “agents of austerity”; tasked on the one hand with administering
unprecedented budget cuts and on the other with catalysing economic growth and
coordinating local welfare programmes which meet “new demands that public services
should empower citizens and communities, develop partnerships, collaborate with ‘civil
society’ groups, and foster ‘co-production’ arrangements with service users” (Newman
& Clarke, 2009, p. 6). How this conundrum is resolved is a deﬁning issue facing local
government today, with “long run and potentially path changing consequences. . .
(Peck, 2012, p. 647).
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In what is proving to be a prescient book for the current conjuncture, Cynthia
Cockburn (1977, p. 2), writing about Lambeth Council in London during the crisis of
Fordism, identiﬁed “two new trends in local government: corporate management and
community development; the one an attempt to exercise tighter control over council
ﬁnance and the workforce, the other an attempt to encourage democracy through
‘participation’”. Recognising the tensions between these modes of governing—one
hierarchical and centralising, the other ostensibly more horizontal, decentralising and
inclusive—Cockburn asked the question “do these two trends pull in opposite direc-
tions, or are they the tough and tender aspects of one principle: management?”
Cockburn concluded in favour of the latter analysis, demonstrating the ways in which
the two seemingly opposed trends were operationalised in concert to gain consent for
the restructuring of local government. In doing so, not only did Cockburn’s work pick
up on what would become a recurrent theme in local government in England, the
enrolling of citizens and “community” in the practices of government, she also recog-
nised the tendency for participatory forms of governance to be folded into the logic of
hierarchy and coercion at a time of austerity.
Thirty years later, writing in the aftermath of the 2008 neoliberal ﬁnancial crisis,
Roger Keil (2009, p. 239) pointed to these two trends anew. For Keil (2009, p. 240),
there are two “possible pathways of urban politics” during the current austerity
moment: Roll-with-it 1 referring to “more authoritarian, capital-oriented, market-ser-
ving policies and political constellations”; and, Roll-with-it 2 referring to “more demo-
cratic, populist, reformist, ecological options” (Keil, 2009). Echoing Cockburn, Keil
does not see these two types of roll-with-it neoliberal governance and politics as
inimical. Rather, they co-exist as two sides of a Janus faced approach to governing
the contradictions of capitalism at the urban scale. The salient question is to which side
is the face now turning, and with what consequences?
In this paper I return to the site of Cockburn’s study and to her enduringly relevant
line of enquiry. Drawing on critical discourse and policy analysis, as well as 48 inter-
views with local actors, I explore the ways in which the pressures of “austerity localism”
(Featherstone, Ince, Mackinnon, Strauss, & Cumbers, 2012) are being managed in the
London Borough of Lambeth through their “Cooperative Council” agenda—an attempt
to enrol citizens, community groups and private-sector partners in new network
governance arrangements and service conﬁgurations—and ask, at a time of seemingly
permanent austerity (Pierson, 1998), how the balance between hierarchic and coercive
(or Roll-with-it 1) and horizontal and consensual (or Roll-with-it 2) modes of govern-
ance is shifting, and with what implications for processes and politics of urban
neoliberalisation after the crash.
To do so, the paper proceeds in three sections. In the ﬁrst, I draw on Foucauldian
and Gramscian-inspired critiques of network governance to extend Cockburn and
Keil’s insights based on a dialectic of coercion and consent. Following this I provide
background context into the challenges facing local authorities in England, highlighting
the shifting operational parameters set by central government within which local actors
manoeuvre. I then evaluate the unfolding governance arrangements and practices of the
case study in relation to the coercion-consent dialectic in two empirical discussions.
The ﬁrst draws out the soft and diﬀuse forms of power as they work through neoliber-
alising rationales, technologies and subjectivities. The second focuses on the harder
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forms of power and the hierarchical and coercive tactics of governance that make up
the realpolitik of decision-making in the council. In the conclusion, I suggest that as
austerity deepens in England we are likely see a shift towards the more coercive
“authoritarian, capital-oriented, market-serving policies and political constellations”
(Keil, 2009, p. 239) associated with “roll-with-it neoliberalization 1”.
2. Theorising consent and coercion in network governance and localism
Emerging in the late 1980s, and growing in volume and diversity since, network
governance theories have identiﬁed and engaged with an apparent shift from “the age
of bureaucratic government” to an “age of network governance” (Sørensen, 2002, p.
693). Broadly speaking, the literature describes a move from “hierarchically organised,
unitary systems of government that govern by means of law, rule and order, to more
horizontally organised and relatively fragmented systems of governance that govern
through the regulation of self-regulating networks” (Sørensen, 2002, p. 693). These
networks have been identiﬁed at multiple scales, across a proliferation of sites, involving
a diversiﬁcation of actors from the state, market and civil society, enrolled in a range of
open and collaborative partnership arrangements and participatory practices. In the UK
context they have been connected to discourses around the “New Localism” (Brenner &
Theodore, 2002), privileging local government as a site for network experimentation.
Running through network styles of governance are “the Habermasian consensual
notions of values in partnership working of mutual trust, sharing, willingness to learn,
and mutual respect. . .” (Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009, p. 1235). Where hierarchies and
markets are seen to operate through command and competition respectively, coopera-
tion and consensus are the key principles for networks to be successful (Davies, 2005).
Echoing Habermas’s normative procedural guidelines for communicative deliberation,
Schmitter (cited in Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1994) suggests ideal governance arrange-
ments should be based on “common and distinctive features”, including “horizontal
interaction among presumptive equal participants without distinction between their
public or private status; regular, iterative exchanges among a ﬁxed set of independent
but interdependent actors; [and] guaranteed (but possibly selective) access, preferably as
early as possible in the decision-making cycle. . .”. While it is decentred by these new
approaches, the state does not disappear from view. Pierre and Stoker (2000) suggested
that the state has a role to play in developing and sustaining consensus by setting a
shared vision, maintaining relationships with and between stakeholders, and regulating
the network’s activities to achieve commonly agreed outcomes.
Advocates of networked approaches to governance make a series of claims about
their potential, including eﬃcacy and eﬃciency arguments, especially with regards to
better coordinating actors and resources to solve “wicked” problems in an increas-
ingly fragmented society, as well as assertions that governance networks, particularly
at the local level, can expand and deepen democratic spaces beyond the conﬁnes of
representative democracy. The virtues of summoning and enrolling citizens in net-
works of governance have been a feature of much network governance theory,
including “Public Value Governance” theories (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomburg,
2014; Dahl & Soss, 2014). Here, citizens are ostensibly aﬀorded a central role in
the co-creation of public values (a society’s normative consensus on rights,
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responsibilities and governing principles) and public value (the public sector equiva-
lent to private sector value), with the promise that rationalities other to those
associated with neoliberalism will gain traction.
Network theory is not without its detractors however. As well as concerns about the
equity, accountability, antiproceduralism and democratic legitimacy of networks,
broader critiques have questioned the disjuncture between rhetoric and reality, ques-
tioning whether networks really work in a horizontal and trust-based way, or whether
in fact “the ideology of networks is a rhetorical sleight of hand that obscures historic
continuities in power relations and governing strategies” (Davies & Spicer, 2015, p. 234;
see also; Raco & Imrie, 2000). A number of studies have pointed to the ways in which
state-led eﬀorts to promote horizontal networks of governance may in fact be impli-
cated in top-down, even autocratic, attempts to develop governmental projects and
scalar ﬁxes capable of managing the contradictions inherent in neoliberal modes of
capitalist accumulation, including by deepening marketisation, privatisation and
responsibilisation in the provision of welfare services (Clarke, 2005; Davies & Spicer,
2015; Newman & Clarke, 2009; Raco, 2013).
Foucauldian critiques have been particularly insightful in this regard. Taking up
Foucault’s “political task” of unmasking “the political violence which has always
exercised itself obscurely” through the workings of “institutions which appear to be
both neutral and independent” (Chomsky & Foucault, 2006, p. 41), a body of work has
emerged to explore the soft and diﬀuse expressions of power as they work through
normative political rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities. The importance of
such interventions here is that they highlight the variety of ways in which the state
mobilises and enrols non-state actors through governance networks as neoliberal
subjects: as entrepreneurs of the self (Lemke, 2002), as self-organising and self-provid-
ing communities (Davies & Pill, 2012; Kokx & Van Kempen, 2009), and as resilient
societies (Joseph, 2013). The normative claims for network governance theory are
shown to be naïve of the multiple, diﬀuse and informal ways in which power operates
and in which conduct is conducted to further governmental aims.
In this vein, Swyngedouw (2005) argued that while the seeds of inclusive and
empowering participation can be found across a range of network governance “innova-
tions”, network governance in practice is decidedly contradictory, and on balance seems
more likely to propagate neoliberalising governmentalities and deepen democratic
deﬁcits. For Swyngedouw whilst they are presented in neutral ways, as magical ﬁxes
that can simultaneously address the democratic deﬁcit and intractable social problems,
consensual governance arrangements are far from neutral. They rearticulate state,
market and civil society relationships in ways that profoundly circumscribe the para-
meters of political democracy; infusing them with neoliberal rationalities (privileging
the market as “the preferred social institution of resource mobilisation and allocation”)
and with neoliberalising technologies of governmentality (downloading more and more
social responsibilities onto civil society) (Swyngedouw, 2005). Dahl and Soss (2014)
reached much the same conclusion in their evaluation of Public Value Governance,
arguing that claims that network arrangements can empower citizens and deepen
democracy are undermined by a tendency to elide “foundational questions of power
and conﬂict and advance prescriptions that are at odds with important democratic
values” (Dahl and Soss 2014 p. 496).
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Building on his earlier work, also stressing the constitutive importance of conﬂict in
urban governance, Jonathan Davies (2010, 2012) has recently argued that analyses of
network governance, including the critical Foucauldian sort, fail to properly grasp the
role of the state, not just in orchestrating the actions of non-state actors through
networks, but also in directly coercing non-state actors through hierarchical modalities
of governance, including through various forms of administrative domination. There is,
he argues, “a signiﬁcant disjuncture between conceptual frameworks that emphasise
soft power and wide-ranging empirical research which points to the incremental roll-
forward of disciplinary state power” (Davies, 2010, p. 8). Recourse to forms of soft
power alone cannot adequately explain contemporary modes of governing generally,
and neoliberalisation and austerity more particularly. A more sophisticated analysis of
harder forms of power is also needed. In order to extend a critique of network
governance which is attentive to the role of coercion in contemporary conﬁgurations
of governance, Davies turns to Gramsci and his notion of the integral state.
Davies draws on Gramsci to theorise the tendency for hierarchy and coercion to
pervade governance at all scales: from the supra-national structural adjustment pro-
grammes of the IMF; to national state violence in Chile under Pinochet and in Britain
under Thatcher; to urban crises, austerity and neglect in 1970s New York City and
contemporary Detroit (Peck, 2014). The notion of the integral state captures the
“dialectical unity of ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’” (Thomas, 2009, p. 30), where
political society is understood as government by force (the coercive power of the state)
and civil society is conceived of as “the terrain upon which social classes compete for
social and political leadership or hegemony. . .” (Davies, 2010, p. 16). When understood
together in this way, political society and civil society demonstrate that at the heart of
the capitalist state exists a dialectic between domination and hegemony, coercion and
consent, and harder and softer forms of power. Since hegemony can never be ﬁnal, and
is always at risk of counter-hegemonic forces, the state must have recourse to domina-
tion and the “armour of coercion”. The coercion-consent dialectic shows us that neither
is ever wholly absent from the processes and practices of governing. For Davies, the
question is not whether a particular conﬁguration of governance is horizontal and
consensual, or hierarchical and coercive; but rather “which term of the relationship is
the most prominent in any spatio-temporal and scalar conjuncture” (Davies, 2010,
p. 17).
From this perspective it is possible to conceive of a continuum of coercive practices
inherent in some guise in all forms of governing, from the spectacular event (including
Naomi Klein’s (2008) instances of neoliberal shock doctrine) to the prosaic practices of
administrative domination: “Just as consent ranges from passive and grudging to active
and enthusiastic, so compulsion is a continuum from bureaucratic impediment to all
out war” (Davies, 2010, p. 18). Coercion and domination cast a long shadow over
consent and hegemony; where the latter cannot be obtained and looks under threat,
which given the many contradictions of capitalism (Harvey, 2014), is oft-recurring, the
shadow materialises more or less forcibly, paradoxically showing both the state’s
strength and its weakness. This means recognising that coercion is not epiphenomenal,
but a routine part of the day-to-day governance of cities and the micro-politics of
everyday life, especially at the interface of the local state, the market and civil society
(Davies, 2014).
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 5
In the empirical discussions that follow, I draw Gramsci and Foucault together to
explicate how the dialectic of consent and coercion works in one speciﬁc case. In doing
so, I am not attempting to combine these two philosophers together into a single water-
tight conceptual totality, gainsaying the important dissonances between their respective
structural and post-structural interpretations of power and ideology (on these see
Daldal, 2014; Kreps, 2016). Rather, the aim is to work generatively and heuristically
with the consonances between Gramsci and Foucault to demonstrate how multiple
forms of “power over” and “power through and between” inhere in social relations and
in fact co-exist dialectically. For Gramsci, “the main problematique of the state is to
incorporate the will of each single individual into the collective will, turning their
necessary consent and collaboration from ‘coercion’ to ‘freedom’” (Daldal, 2014, p.
156). Foucault can help us understand how certain “common sense” ideas are normal-
ised, however incompletely, through speciﬁc rationalities, technologies and subjectiv-
ities, and how power functions at the microscale of local state practices to procure
consent positively in relation to and through civil society. A Gramscian approach
enables us to relate Foucault’s micropolitical analysis to broader logics of macropolitical
state restructuring and also, through his attentiveness to political society and power
over, clariﬁes how the state responds when Foucauldian governmental projects fail.
3. Whatever is happening to local government and governance in England?
The context out of which network theory and practice emerged is reﬂected in today’s
similar conjuncture of austerity and state restructuring. Writing in the wake of over a
decade of Margaret Thatcher’s austerity-driven neoliberal experimentations, as “Britain
was on the cusp of systemic changes in modes of urban governance” (Ward et al., 2015,
p. 443), Alan Cochrane (1993) asked “whatever happened to local government?”
Recognising, and to some extent anticipating, the importance of networks to local
governance, Cochrane suggested that local government in England was undergoing a
process of fragmentation and decentring as a “proliferation of diﬀerent agencies. . . both
in the ﬁelds of welfare and economic development” (Cochrane, 1993, p. 5) became
important actors and part of the local state’s transformation along more competitive
and entrepreneurial lines. Cochrane’s analysis would prove insightful. Following the
election of New Labour in 1997, the signiﬁcance of relational, collaborative and partner-
ship-based modes of governance grew and the enabling role of local government was
valorised (Bailey and Pill, 2015). Now, after ﬁve years of ﬁscal retrenchment, aimed
decidedly at local government, Cochrane’s question takes on renewed relevance—
whatever is happening to local government and, we can now add, governance?
In England institutional transformation, governance reform and public-service
restructuring at the urban scale are being driven along two axes (Ward et al., 2015),
both of which run through local government. The ﬁrst axis echoes a familiar narrative
of decline, or roll-back neoliberalism as witnessed under Thatcher in the late 1970s to
mid-1980s. In 2010, opting to address a perceived public deﬁcit problem overwhel-
mingly through public spending cuts, the Coalition Government set about rolling back
the frontiers of the social state, targeting the budgets of local government especially.
Between 2011 and 2015 the budget of the Department for Communities and Local
Government (DCLG), responsible for allocating local government revenue funding,
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experienced cuts of almost 40% in real terms (Beatty & Fothergill, 2014). This was
complemented in 2013 by a further 10% of cuts, with 56% more announced up until
2020 following the election of a majority Conservative government in May 2015
(Lowndes & Gardner, 2016). To put these ﬁgures into historical context, the cuts up
to 2015 are estimated to be three times the level of those experienced during the
previous notable round of austerity in English Local Government between 1978 and
1985 (Newman, 2014). Geographically the distribution of these reductions has been
uneven. In a move away from the principle of spatial redistribution in local government
funding, the Coalition Government have applied a ﬂat-rate cut to all local authorities
(Innes & Tetlow, 2015) and have abolished Area-Based Grants for the most deprived
parts of the country. Consequently, those local authorities most dependent on central
government funds have seen “the largest average cuts to spending per person” (IFS,
2015), including many boroughs in London (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015).
Along the second axis, Local Government has been constructed afresh as a site for
“catalysing latent potentialities for economic growth” (Ward et al., 2015, p. 443) and
civic renewal. In a move almost without precedent in the history of local government
funding in England, the Business Rate Retention Scheme (BRRS), introduced in April
2013, decouples local government funding from local need and erodes what had been
an enduring commitment to spatial equalisation since the late-19th century (Sandford,
2016). Within rules eﬀectively limiting the amount local authorities can increase council
tax by to 1.99 per cent, this new funding regime is designed to replace central govern-
ment funding for local services with local business taxes by 2020. This ensures that the
future of local services, including instituted and centrally mandated welfare duties to
meet growing demands for social care, will be ﬁnancially dependent upon local eco-
nomic development. It also encourages local authorities to compete for investment in
an opportunity-driven framework which elides enduring spatial and regional inequal-
ities in a single-minded, “aspirational”, focus on economic growth (Pugalis &
McGuiness, 2013).
Meanwhile, through the Localism Act local government is expected to lead the way
on public service modernisation, enrolling citizens and communities in open and plural
public service networks that save money whilst empowering “local people”, unleashing
civic entrepreneurialism and reviving grass-roots engagement. Eliding the growth in
private sector entanglements with the social state, especially locally (Raco, 2013), and
obscuring the inequalities, diﬀerences and conﬂicts between diverse and shifting com-
munities of “local people” (Featherstone et al., 2012), a series of community rights are
somewhat hopefully expected to give people greater choice and control in and over local
services and incentivise volunteering as part of the nebulous big society agenda. In this
way, local authorities are exhorted to pull back from providing services directly and
instead look to a plurality of potential providers, including community groups, cha-
rities, social enterprises and private companies.
There are continuities between what is happening to local government today, and
some of the trends that Cochrane identiﬁed in the early 1990s. Local Government is
once again being used to absorb and resolve the crisis tendencies of neoliberal capitalist
accumulation and uneven development through local governance innovation. However,
these policies amount to more than a simple return to the roll-back and roll-out policies
of neoliberalism witnessed under Thatcher and New Labour. Whilst current approaches
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certainly draw on and rework extant processes of entrepreneurialism and competition,
privatisation and marketisation, and responsibilisation, the extent and nature of ﬁscal
disciplining today deepens and broadens the scope and scale of neoliberal local state
restructuring, opening up new frontiers in the antagonistic, push and pull, landscape of
local government and governance (Newman, 2013) as authorities seek to harmonise
retrenchment and restructuring simultaneously.
The rest of this paper focuses on a “critical” (see Flyvbjerg, 2006) case study of the
tensions and contradictions of managing “austerity localism” in the inner-London
borough of Lambeth. Drawing on qualitative research conducted between January
2015 and April 2016, involving discourse/policy analysis, 48 in-depth interviews with
local actors, and observations at public council meetings, the next section explores the
council’s primary response to ﬁscal retrenchment and local state restructuring in two
empirical discussions, organised around the dialectic of consent-coercion. The ﬁrst
discussion, framed around Foucault’s governmental “triptych” (rationalities, technolo-
gies and subjectivities), explores how Lambeth council seeks to govern through civil
society by enrolling citizens and “communities” in new consensual public service
conﬁgurations. The second looks at what happens when civil society “partners” act in
unexpected and unscripted ways, highlighting some of the hierarchic modes and
coercive tactics of governing with which the council responds.
4. Governing “Austerity Localism” in Lambeth: the dialectic of consent and
coercion
The London Borough of Lambeth is one of the largest of London’s inner-city local
authorities, stretching from Waterloo on the Southbank of the river Thames in the
North, down to Crystal Palace and Streatham in the South East and South West
respectively (Figure 1.) It is a largely residential borough, and one of the most densely
populated, with over 100 people per hectare—over twice the average London popula-
tion density. It is home to an ethnically diverse population and, like London generally,
is an unequal place; there are pockets of entrenched deprivation, concentrated in the
wards near Brixton, as well as areas of high aﬄuence, particularly in parts of Clapham.
Like many other deprived London boroughs (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015), Lambeth
has been hard hit by the government’s austerity measures. By 2018, Lambeth council
are expected to make over £200 m of savings following a 50% reduction in their
settlement funding from central government, which made up three-quarters of the
authority’s total revenue income (Figure 2.). Lambeth’s capital ﬁnances are also under
pressure. Lambeth has been heavily reliant on central government for capital invest-
ment, which is spent on council housing provision and maintenance, schools, roads and
parks. Following a 60% reduction in Central Government contributions to Lambeth’s
capital budget since 2010 a funding gap of £93.2 m has opened up for what the council
describes as key infrastructural and maintenance work.
Already tensions are emerging out of this “austerian” regime in Lambeth. Over the
next three years planned cuts will compromise the council’s ability to provide services
as rising need, a product of demographic change and central government welfare
reform, outstrips the council’s shrinking budget capacity. Belying central government
rhetoric about the scale of eﬃciencies still to be made in local government, the council’s
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Figure 1. The London borough of Lambeth.
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Figure 2. Actual and projected Lambeth Council funding from central government between 2010
and 2019.
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2015 budget report showed that several key services are forecast to overspend, including
those for vulnerable groups such as mental health services, temporary accommodation,
and children’s social care. Requirements to meet statutory responsibilities for social care
in particular risk overwhelming the council’s budget, drawing resources away from
discretionary services. As one senior oﬃcer in Lambeth Council noted:
“We estimate that our total budget in 2018 will be equivalent to what we are spending on
adults and children’s social care at the moment. . . Our adults and children’s social care
budgets are spent on about 10,000 people and we have a population of over 300,000. So it’s
not possible to protect adults and children’s social care. . . and anyway people value parks,
they want to have their bins emptied”. Senior Commissioner.
This unfolding social care “crisis” is a London-wide issue. In a recent report by London
Councils, an advocacy group for local government in the city, it is estimated that by
2019/20 social care alone will account for 58% of borough spending across London, up
from 39% in 2010. When combined with waste management responsibilities, another
signiﬁcant statutory duty placed on local government, it is estimated that 67% of local
government funding in London will be spent on meeting statutory responsibilities,
leaving less to spend on discretionary services, such as parks, libraries, youth services,
and the like. As London’s population ages and a growing number of people live longer
with physical and mental disabilities, ﬁnancing social care, which is already more costly
in London than elsewhere in England due in large part to inﬂated “production costs”, is
fast becoming a mission impossible. In a context of shrinking revenue budgets, if these
instituted welfare commitments continue to be ﬁnanced at the local level, as looks likely
for the foreseeable future, the operational parameters of the local authority and people’s
collective choices, be they expressed through representative or participatory forms of
governance, will necessarily be narrowed.
4.1 Conducting consent: normalisation, responsibilisation and
contractualisation
In May 2010, anticipating the cuts to come, the London Borough of Lambeth set out
its ambition to reshape the settlement between citizens and the state by becoming a
“Cooperative Council”. Reﬂecting a growing interest from public authorities across
the UK in recruiting citizens in the business of governing, managing and providing
for themselves (Newman & Clarke, 2009), the Labour-led council proposed to
develop equal relationships with communities, civil society and non-proﬁt organisa-
tions: incentivising “citizens to play a more active role in their local community. . .”;
and encouraging a “wide range of service providers (be they social enterprises,
cooperatives, public sector organisations, businesses, faith organisations. . . [etc.]) to
deliver tailored services in diﬀerent areas” (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 4. To achieve
this it was recognised that the local state’s role would need to change from a
“deliverer of services” to a “facilitator of cooperative working”, shaping the political
vision and coordinating local actors eﬀorts to achieve commonly agreed outcomes
(Lambeth Council, 2011).
The stated rationales for moving towards a new cooperative approach to governance
and service delivery in Lambeth were set out by the former leader of the council Steven
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Reed in the forward to the council’s report Sharing Power: A new settlement between
citizens and state (Lambeth Council, 2011). Drawing on network governance rhetoric in
ways that resonate with Third Way progressivist discourses, as well as the Coalition
government’s Open Public Services, Big Society, and Localism agendas, Reed made a
series of connected claims in support of “fundamental change”. First, that due to
funding cuts, local government cannot survive in its current form and that change is
objectively necessary. Secondly, that local government is too hierarchical, top-down,
and managerial to eﬀectively address “wicked” social issues. Third, that local govern-
ment is overly paternalistic and has reached too far into community matters, crowding
out bottom-up initiatives, enterprise, and “the virtues of mutualism, civic action, and
self-reliance” (Williams, Goodwin, & Cloke, 2014, p. 2800). And ﬁnally, that a demo-
cratic-deﬁcit characterises relationships between the council, citizens and communities,
preventing the full realisation of people’s needs and wants. To remedy the situation,
Reed suggests that local government must engage citizens and a plurality of local service
providers in more equal and collaborative relationships to “ﬁnd new and better ways of
delivering public services in the 21st century” (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 2).
From the outset, Reed was careful to distance the Cooperative Council from the
Coalition Government’s austerity and Big Society agendas, as well as from the
Conservative-led London Borough of Barnet’s privatising approach, stating that:
“The Tories’ ‘easyCouncil’ model, championed by Barnet council, means substandard
services for most people with the wealthy few able to pay for ‘upgrades’ to better quality.
That is fundamentally unfair and in Lambeth we reject that. . . We also stand apart from
David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ model that is really just about a smaller state”. (Reed, 2010,
n.p.)
However, whilst Reed does not go as far as to uphold the Coalition Government’s
zero-sum understanding of the relationship between civil society and the (local) state
(see Featherstone et al., 2012), it is nonetheless clear from reading early policy
documents that the Cooperative Council is framed by, and embeds, the logic of
austerity as an incontrovertible macro-economic exigency, requiring a rethinking of
New Labour’s partnership approach based on funding and capacity building for the
institutionalised collective engagement of civil society. In step with network-oriented
discourses and policy models propagated and circulated by various think-tanks and
policy experts, including those of “public value” and “relational governance” (see
Newman, 2014), Lambeth Council positioned citizen and community empowerment
instrumentally, as a means of delivering eﬃciency savings and managing demand. In
contradistinction to the political leadership of the early 1980s, which (in)famously
refused to cap rates at the expense of meeting local need, the council have, however
reluctantly, accepted the disciplinarian logic of austerity as inevitable, privileging
ﬁscal restraint, eﬃciency and demand management over meeting people’s growing
needs. As budget cuts have continued, austerity has been accepted and normalised as
an axiom of responsible governance, infusing the Cooperative Council with norma-
tive appeals for people to be sensible, do the right thing and take over local services,
or risk losing them.
In its early manifestations, the Cooperative Council was implemented tentatively and
unevenly in various experiments that sought to responsibilise citizens and community
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groups across a range of service areas, including in children and youth services, libraries
and parks management, and street cleaning. Obscuring the extent to which services
were already being outsourced to large national and multinational providers, as well as
the proliferation in recent years of public/private entanglements in the delivery of local
welfare, community and voluntary groups were privileged in early policy documents
and constructed as “sites of desire”, “where people can govern, provision and manage
themselves beyond the structures of state systems” (Newman & Clarke, 2009, p. 46).
They have been summoned through a range of “technologies of agency” to deploy their
own freedoms, skills and capacities to meet Lambeth Council’s objectives, including by:
mediating state projects, as when residents and (in)formal groups have been asked to
consult on ways of redesigning public services with and without the state; drawing on
resources beyond the state, for example, through appeals to citizens and friends of parks
groups to match fund (by crowdfunding and bid writing) £9 m for parks improvement
works; and by acting as alternatives to the state, when, for example, residents are
nudged to “do the right thing” and organise street cleaning “parties”, shovel snow,
say hello to neighbours, or take over the management of buildings, libraries and parks
(Figure 3).
This form of citizen engagement with, and participation in, local government is built
around constituting and enlisting similar kinds of subjectivities—the responsible and
responsibilised active citizen—implied by the Big Society and Localism Act. Echoing
central government rhetoric, Lambeth residents are told that the future survival of local
services is predicated on their active engagement with and beyond the council in the
design and delivery of those services. Doing the right thing in this context means taking
on a number of idealised roles in relation to the local state, including that of the
“charitable self”, “called upon to exemplify the virtues of self-help, community resi-
lience, and philanthropy” (Williams et al., 2014, p. 2802); the “entrepreneurial volun-
teer”, encouraged to take part in Made in Lambeth “hack”/“challenge” events by using
their creative skills as “graphic designers, artists, project managers and community
organisers. . . [as well as] legal, ﬁnancial and software development skills” to improve
local services; and as the “citizen auditor”, summoned to take advantage of Lambeth
council’s pioneering role in Central Government’s Open Data Programme and hold
councillors and council oﬃcers to account for money (mis)spent.
In 2012, recognising that the sum of these technologies of agency lacked strategic
direction and was, in bleak ﬁnancial circumstances, unlikely to deliver suﬃcient cost
savings, the council adopted a more top-down and calculative approach, seeking to
embed their cooperative principles through new “technologies of performance” within
established commissioning, procurement and contracting practices. This decision led
quickly to a reorganisation of the authority: Five service departments were rationalised
into three areas of commissioning activity; an “outcomes-based” model was developed
to guide service planning, allocate resources, procure goods and services, and manage
contracts; and cabinet members were empowered as lead commissioners, strengthening
hierarchical executive structures within the council.
Commissioning was an already established practice in Lambeth long before it became
cooperative, having been embraced in the mid-2000s. By 2010 the authority was one of the
most outsourced in the country. The Cooperative Commissioning approach then signals
more of an evolution of previously established practice, than anything transformational. In
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order to embed cooperative principles into this new commissioning model, citizens and
community groups are called on to co-produce decision making at all stages of the extant
commissioning cycle, from setting outcomes (in line with the council’s strategic priorities),
to helping choose preferred providers (from a short-list selected by commissioners) and
evaluate the quality of provision (following the council’s performance indicators and
benchmarks). Prospective providers, for their part, are expected to comply with expecta-
tions to coproduce the design and delivery of services (as a means of managing demand),
demonstrate ﬁnancial sustainability (understood as evidencing a business model that is not
reliant on council funding beyond the short term), and, in line with the Public Services Act,
Figure 3. Doing the right thing.
Source: Author’s photograph
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deliver additional “social value” by, inter alia, paying employees the London Living Wage,
providing apprenticeship and volunteering opportunities, and contributing to the coun-
cil’s strategic outcomes including by reducing social isolation and increasing “community
resilience”. This kind of social value is expected in addition to the “core” outcomes
speciﬁed in the terms of the service contract and is to be provided without extra resourcing
from the authority.
Belying the cooperative qualiﬁcation, these commissioning goals are translated into
concrete and calculable interventions through competitive processes of contractualisation.
Cooperative principles are embedded into a “utopian top-down model of contractual
management” (Raco, 2014, p. 177) where budget cuts and desired service delivery models,
outcomes and social value are packaged together into discrete contracts and put out to tender
in an increasingly competitive funding environment. In this way the council devolves
responsibility for achieving “more for less” and, to a certain extent, insulates itself from the
demands of the public by requiring provider organisations to manage relationships with
service users. The council’s role becomes increasingly regulative, working to ensure that
providers meet the terms of their contract (still measured by New Public Management
inspired technologies of performance, including KPIs) and that contracts provide value for
money, despite staﬃng reductions which reduce its capacity to do so in practice.
Whilst mobilising discourses of cooperation, equal partnership and consensually
agreed outcomes, a Foucauldian perspective, exploring the soft and diﬀuse expres-
sions of governmental power as they operate through normative political rational-
ities, technologies and subjectivities, suggests that Lambeth Council are trying to
“utilize, instrumentalize and mobilize techniques and agents other than those of the
‘state’ in order to govern ‘at a distance’. . . according to their own programmes and to
mobilize resources for their own ends” (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 181 emphasis added).
Whilst denying that this is a “cuts-driven agenda” and taking care to present it as a
bottom-up political programme for community empowerment, the council are
enrolling community and voluntary organisations in a top-down governmental
project whose underlying role—whether stated and intended, or not—is to help
absorb the contradictions of the global ﬁnancial crisis, as manifest in the politics of
centrally prescribed and downloaded austerity, by deepening processes of responsi-
bilisation and contractualisation in the provision of local public services and welfare.
In so doing, the Cooperative Council agenda mobilises an ambiguous mixture of
technologies of agency and performance that: instrumentalises citizens and commu-
nities, whilst obscuring its own responsibilities for them; enrols service providers
into ostensibly cooperative contractual arrangements, whilst eliding the uneven
power relations between diﬀerent providers and between providers and the council;
and constructs “the community and voluntary sector as depoliticised acquiescent
actors willing to work alongside [their cooperative]. . . vision. . .” (Williams et al.,
2014, p. 2802).
4.2 From consent to coercion: bureaucratic impediment, administrative
domination and unlawful dissimulation
Lambeth council have made much of the democratic potential of the Cooperative
Council, claiming that power is being shared, services co-designed, and budgets set in
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more open processes. In doing so the council constructs a harmonious and consensual
vision of community action, obscuring the varying means, social positions and con-
tingencies of diﬀerent communities (Brown, 2015) and underestimating the ways in
which civil society groups have “been associated with forms of politics that make them
ambiguous and potentially diﬃcult ‘partners’ for government” (Newman & Clarke,
2009, p. 46). In this section, I explore examples of what happens when civil society
actors become diﬃcult partners, showing the ways in which, at a time of increasing
ﬁscal pressure, the council reverts to hierarchical modes of decision-making and
employs coercive tactics to govern, including bureaucratic impediment, administrative
domination and unlawful dissimulation.
Even before the reality of austerity was fully known, there were signs that the
council’s willingness to coproduce with its citizens would extend only so far as citizens
were willing to play “depoliticised acquiescent” roles. In an illuminating section on
political leadership in the Sharing Power report, it is stated that:
“In developing this shared vision for the improvements which need to be made in the
borough and the outcomes Lambeth Council wishes to realise, it will be essential that this
process does not thwart an elected council administration’s duty to carry out its manifesto
commitments”. (Lambeth Council, 2011, p. 28 emphasis added)
From the outset then, the participation of citizens in shaping the future of the local
state, of engaging in debates over the proper role, quality and functions of local
government, was limited to complementing and building on manifesto commitments
made with little public participation. Anything else is framed as a potential threat to the
political commitments and aspirations of the council, rather than as potentially pro-
ductive expressions of “agonism” (Mouﬀe, 2005). This has been made clear in recent
years through the council’s cooperative consultation process on the future of leisure
services, including libraries.
As already noted, the council’s decision-making scope over the prioritisation of
diﬀerent services in the borough is limited by centrally mandated duties pertaining to
adult and social care services, which despite supporting around 10% of the local
population, absorb over half of the council’s revenue budget. As pressure on funding
has increased, the council’s political priority has been to protect social care spending at
the expense of discretionary budgets, leaving parks, libraries and leisure services on the
frontline of budget cuts, with savings requirements set at £4 m. Tensions between the
council’s commitment to cooperative governance and more hierarchic modes and
coercive tactics of governing have emerged as a result.
In an attempt to procure consent for these cuts and enrol citizens in possible
“solutions”, in February 2015 the council initiated the Cultural Services 2020 consulta-
tion, detailing how the parks, library and leisure services were to be reconﬁgured.
Within the parameters of a ﬁxed ﬁnancial envelope, the council initially proposed
selling two of their libraries and transferring the management of three more to com-
munity groups, who would become responsible for fundraising and service delivery.
These proposals were strongly opposed by the council’s library staﬀ and those com-
munity groups the council had hoped would “do the right thing” and take over these
“assets”, on the grounds that they were unsustainable and over-responsibilised com-
munities. The consultation process was also heavily criticised for not giving community
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groups suﬃcient time to formulate alternative ideas, and for failing to seriously consider
those which were proposed in time, including one by the head of the libraries service.
Several weeks after the formal consultation process had ended, the council
announced that a last-minute “behind the scenes” deal had been made with a
London-based social business. In a move that had not been part of the original
consultation, the social business agreed to take over the management of the buildings
currently housing Lambeth’s libraries and turn them into private gyms, promising to
provide a much reduced public library service on the side. This new model has
provoked signiﬁcant and sustained resistance from a heterotopic alliance of community
groups, trade unionists, activists, disaﬀected council oﬃcers and one Labour councillor,
who have organised a high-proﬁle campaign and engaged in a range of disruptive
tactics, including occupying one of the libraries for a week, attracting national press
coverage. In response the council have become increasingly defensive and coercive:
After evicting the occupiers, Lambeth council are now spending more money on paying
private security guards to keep libraries closed than it cost to keep them open, and after
public remarks criticising the council’s plans, the aforementioned Labour councillor has
been suspended from the party for six-months.
Framed by the ﬁscal parameters set by central government, statutory imperatives and
the executive decisions of senior councillors and oﬃcers, the limits of participatory
democracy at a time of austerity have been thrown into sharp relief. Yet, the Cultural
Services 2020 consultation is not an isolated example. Despite drawing extensively on
the language of bottom-up participatory cooperation between local actors, with few
exceptions the engagement of citizens and community and voluntary organisations with
the Cooperative Council is taking place on a time-limited, project-by-project, basis
where local residents and groups are encouraged to take part in “invited” spaces of
participation in which agendas are pre-determined and substantive decisions have
already been made by senior councillors and oﬃcers. This is noticeable throughout
the council’s commissioning approach. In spite of stated aims that Cooperative
Commissioning processes would be coproduced by residents and service users, the
changes detailed in the previous section seem to have centralised decision making,
giving more power to cabinet members and senior oﬃcers. As one commissioner put it:
“The power has shifted to the cabinet and the directors primarily. Decisions are made
behind closed doors and nobody is made part of those decisions below the director
level”. This group of actors make all budget related decisions, including setting budgets
for speciﬁc services and balancing budgets across priority areas. This has a signiﬁcant
bearing on the kinds of service models tendered by the council.
Within the commissioning approach, speciﬁc procurement and contracting pro-
cesses tend towards hierarchy and coercion by working against equal forms of associa-
tion and undermining the collectivisation of responsibility through practices of
competitive tendering that shape preferred market behaviours and pit prospective
providers against one another for increasingly small amounts of money. However
well-intentioned the cooperative commissioning approach may be, when rolled out at
a time of austerity, with the expectations that organisations will deliver more for less,
the approach risks “doubly responsibilising” providers. They are expected to compete
with one another to attract sources of funding and contribute to the wider economic,
social and environmental well-being of the borough “in the context of powers and
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contingencies radically limiting their ability to do so” (Brown, 2015, p. 131). At their
worst these contractual devices serve as technologies of administrative domination.
They are mechanisms by which the council “downloads” the risks and responsibilities
of budget cuts, promulgates further neoliberalising governmentalities by “installing
‘economic’ logics of calculation. . . and strategies of ‘self-governing’ subjects”
(Newman, 2013, p. 6), and mobilises various forms of invisible community labour
through expectations of added social value.
Local providers, whose funding options are increasingly limited within and beyond
the council, are reticent to put their heads above the proverbial parapet and challenge
this state of aﬀairs. Several council oﬃcers recognised this and explained that the fact
and threat of de-commissioning “troublesome” partners was muting the collective voice
of the VCS. One prominent organisation, who helped coordinate the voice of VCS
organisations in the borough, found their funding withdrawn in 2013. Council oﬃcers
intimated that this had little to do with concerns around eﬃcacy or eﬃciency and much
to do with the organisation’s antagonistic relationship with senior oﬃcers and coun-
cillors. In its place a volunteer centre was commissioned with a reduced budget,
challenging self-fundraising responsibilities and a more tightly prescribed mission
focused on volunteering.
The tendency to revert to hierarchical and coercive modes of governance when
consent cannot be secured, has been further exempliﬁed in recent years by several
local housing campaigns, organised to prevent the eviction of long-standing housing
cooperatives, and the demolition/regeneration of some of the council’s housing estates,
including Cressingham Gardens and Central Hill estates. A full account of these cases is
beyond the scope of this paper, however a summary of the Save Cressingham Gardens
campaign highlights a number of shared concerns with how the council have operated.
In December 2012, Lambeth Council notiﬁed residents of Cressingham Gardens, an
architecturally celebrated estate bordering Brockwell Park in Tulse Hill, that improve-
ment works would be required to bring almost half of the homes on the estate up to
Lambeth’s Housing Standard. The notiﬁcation suggested that refurbishment was not
viable; not only was it unaﬀordable within the council’s reduced capital budget, but it
would also be insuﬃcient given the structural scale of the improvements needed. The
council were therefore considering some form of estate demolition and regeneration,
whilst promising residents to “look at all possible options for improving [the estate]. . .”
Adding that, “so long as they are high quality, aﬀordable, sustainable and meet the
needs of residents. . . then they will be considered”. Following this, between July and
September 2013, Lambeth Council contracted Social Life, a community engagement
consultancy, to run a “consultation and co-production process” with residents to gauge
their opinions on ﬁve options for the estate, ranging from refurbishment and in-build
(options 1–3) to partial or complete demolition and re-build (options 4 and 5).
Overwhelmingly, residents favoured option 1 for refurbishment.
Despite consulting on all ﬁve of these options into 2015, the council claimed that
refurbishment was not a viable option for the estate. They argued that it would cost
more than the council could aﬀord within its reduced capital budget and that there was
a need to deliver greater density on the estate to contribute towards a 2014 manifesto
commitment to build 1,000 new homes at council rent levels in the borough. The future
of the estate was framed increasingly in terms of ﬁnancial exigencies, poor quality
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housing and the need to house some of the 21,000 people on the housing waiting list. In
the winter of 2014/15 the council continued to engage with residents on the estate over
all 5 options, with a speciﬁc project team set up to scrutinise the ﬁnancial viability of
each. On the 26th of February, however, whilst the ﬁnancial scrutiny was still on-going,
the council presented residents with an unexpected fait accompli: that the council
would be no longer be consulting on options 1 to 3, which they considered unaﬀordable
based on their unreleased viability assessments, and that they intended to pursue option
5 instead (Figure 4).
In March 2015 Lambeth’s Cabinet approved the complete demolition of the estate
and its regeneration through a controversial Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which
transfers ownership of the estate to a private company, run by the council. This new
company enables the council to make use of the “rent gap” on the estate and seek
external investment outside of the constraints imposed by the capital budget to build
new homes at market values, subsidising the building of an additional 27 homes at
council rent levels. Controversially, the SPV eﬀectively privatises the council homes on
the estate, whose landlord will be the SPV and not the council directly, aﬀecting their
tenancy agreements. The SPV can also be sold in the future, should the council’s
ﬁnancial position worsen, potentially acting as a gateway to Global Corporate
Landlorship (GLC) (Beswick et al., 2016).
Residents involved with the Save Cressingham Gardens (See http://savecressingham.
wordpress.com/) campaign have accused the council of behaving uncooperatively and
of pursuing coercive tactics ranging from bureaucratic impediment to unlawful dissim-
ulation, including: failing to communicate consistently and honestly; refusing to divulge
key ﬁnancial information about the viability of the diﬀerent options being consulted on;
exaggerating the costs of refurbishment to legitimise demolition; trying to set lease-
holders and council tenants against one another; rejecting in just two days a profes-
sionally produced alternative business case for a green retroﬁt of Cressingham Gardens;
misleading council tenants about the nature of the SPV and leaseholders about the cost
of buying a new home on the estate; and acting unilaterally against the wishes of the
Figure 4. Residents of Cressingham Gardens make their grievances known.
Source: Brockwell
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majority of residents, despite previous assurances from the Leader of the Council that
they would not do so. In November 2015, residents won a successful judicial challenge
(Bokrosova Vs London Borough of Lambeth) against the council concerning the nature
of the consultation, which the judge stated had been “unlawful” for removing options 1
to 3 whilst they were still being scrutinised by the resident-led project team. Whilst the
verdict did not overturn Lambeth’s decision to demolish the estate, it did require the
council to re-run their consultation process.
At the time of writing, despite overwhelming and continuing opposition from
leaseholders and tenants, the local authority continue to push through their plans for
estate demolition, limiting consultation with residents to inﬂuencing decisions made
within the frame of option 5.
5. Conclusion: towards ‘Roll-with-it 1ʹ?
This paper has sought to shed light on the governance and politics of “austerity localism”
through a case study of the Cooperative Council in Lambeth. Framed in relation to a
Foucauldian and Gramscian analysis of consent and coercion as dialectically related modes
of governing, it has been argued that the scale and nature of the ﬁnancial pressures facing
local authorities has, in this case, helped push Lambeth Council towards more hierarchic
and coercive practices. Yet, this case study has also indicated that the Cooperative Council
cannot be fully understood as an instance of good intentions blown oﬀ course by the strong
headwinds of neoliberal austerity (Peck & Theodore, 2015). Such an interpretation would
over-determine the role of central government at the expense of a more granular analysis of
the antagonistic political landscape of local government. Rather, it has been shown that the
Cooperative Council, from the outset, articulated with austerian discourses, circulating
between and beyond central and local policy actors that accept as axiomatic the need to
make budget cuts and reconﬁgure the relations between state, market and civil society.
Within a context of waning ﬁscal democracy locally, it also inhered a set of enduring
tensions between participatory and representative decision-making, intrinsic and instru-
mental attitudes towards citizen and community empowerment, and what the public values
and what is seen as being valuable for the public. As an urban policy, the Cooperative
Council emerged from and evolved through shifting central-local relations, the limitations
of territorially bounded politics, and locally unresolved tensions inherent to network
governance theory and practice. The shift that this paper has identiﬁed towards hierarchic
and coercive governance must be understood within this context.
Thinking ahead, as Davies (2010, p. 17) puts it, the question is not so much whether a
particular conﬁguration is horizontal and consensual, or hierarchical and coercive; but
“which term of the relationship is the most prominent in any spatio-temporal and scalar
conjuncture”. The election in May 2015 of a Conservative majority Government spells
further immiseration for local authorities in England, who are again expected to shoulder
the burden of deﬁcit reduction. As budgets are reduced year on year, leaving less to spend on
discretionary services, the council’s ability and appetite to enrol citizens in receding local
services is lessening. Already there are signs that the Cooperative Council agenda is losing
political backing; in the 2014 local Labourmanifesto the termwas not used at all.Whilst small
and relatively inexpensive experiments in local service provision may continue, the pressures
towards the centralisation of governance and towards outsourcing to large private providers
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and attracting private ﬁnancial investment, including through Special Purpose Vehicles, are
great. At a time of deepening and seemingly permanent austerity, the balance between
horizontal networks and hierarchy, between soft and hard forms of power, and between
consent and coercion seems likely to tip inexorably to the latter.
As this happens the ability of local authorities to neutralise dissent “through co-
optation and marginalization of critique” (Keil, 2009, p. 237) may come under pressure
as the infusion of neoliberal austerity with social policy rhetoric and other apparently
progressive political registers rings increasingly hollow. Already across London “activist
citizens” are looking beyond the narrow terms of public service reform to ask more
fundamental questions about collective consumption and the processes of urban devel-
opment, capitalist accumulation and creative destruction constitutive of urbanisation in
London and what, if anything, the local state can do about such issues. As citizens step
further outside of the spaces prescribed for their engagement, and act in unauthorised
ways as citizen activists, pretence to cooperative and collaborative decision making may
well dissolve, emphasising more clearly the point that the state must always have
recourse to domination and the “armour of coercion”.
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